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Abstract
In this paper the egalitarian solution for convex cooperative
fuzzy games is introduced. The classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for
ﬁnding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games
is adjusted to provide the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy
game. This adjusted algorithm is also a ﬁnite algorithm, because
the convexity of a fuzzy game implies in each step the existence
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1of a maximal element which corresponds to a crisp coalition. For
arbitrary fuzzy games the equal division core is introduced. It
turns out that both the equal division core and the egalitarian
solution of a convex fuzzy game coincide with the correspond-
ing equal division core and the constrained egalitarian solution,
respectively, of the related crisp game.
JEL: C71
MSC: 90D12; 03E72
Keywords: Convex games, Core, Egalitarian solutions, Equal
division core, Fuzzy coalitions, Fuzzy games
1 Introduction
The concept of egalitarianism, mainly based on Lorenz domination, has gen-
erated several core-related solution concepts on the set of cooperative crisp
games with transferable utility (cooperative TU-games): the constrained
egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray (1989)), the Lorenz solution (Hougaard
et al. (2001)), the Lorenz stable set and the egalitarian core (Arin and Inarra
(2001)). The class of convex crisp games is the only standard class of coop-
erative TU-games for which the constrained egalitarian solution exists and,
moreover, it belongs to the core and Lorenz dominates every other core allo-
cation. It turns out that all the other egalitarian solutions mentioned above
coincide for convex crisp games with the constrained egalitarian solution.
On this class of cooperative TU-games alternative axiomatic characteriza-
tions of the constrained egalitarian solution are provided by Dutta (1990),
Hokari (2000), Klijn et al. (2000). This solution for a convex crisp game can
be obtained using the algorithm proposed by Dutta and Ray (1989) or the
2formula suggested by Hokari (2000).
Another solution concept related to the norm of equity is the equal di-
vision core proposed by Selten (1972). He introduces it in order to explain
outcomes in experimental cooperative games and notes that in 76 % of 207
experimental games the outcomes have a ”strong tendency to be in the equal
division core”. Axiomatic characterizations of this solution concept on two
classes of cooperative TU-games are provided by Bhattacharya (2002).
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce on one hand the egalitarian
solution in the context of convex fuzzy games as proposed by Branzei et al.
(2002a), and on the other hand the equal division core for arbitrary fuzzy
games.
Cooperative fuzzy games have proved to be suitable for modelling coop-
erative behavior of agents in economic situations (Billot (1995), Nishizaki
and Sakawa (2001)) and political situations (Butnariu (1978), Lebret and
Ziad (2001)) in which some agents do not fully participate in a coalition but
only to a certain extent. For example in a class of production games, partial
participation in a coalition means to oﬀer a part of the resources while full
participation means to oﬀer all the resources. A coalition including players
who participate partially can be treated in the context of cooperative game
theory as a so-called fuzzy coalition, introduced by Aubin (1974, 1981).
The theory of cooperative fuzzy games started with the cited work of
Aubin where the notions of a fuzzy game and the core of a fuzzy game are
introduced. In the meantime many solution concepts have been developed
(cf. Branzei et al. (2002a, b), Butnariu (1978), Molina and Tejada (2002),
Nishizaki and Sakawa (2001), Sakawa and Nishizaki (1994), Tsurumi et al.
(2001)).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide the nec-
3essary notions and facts for cooperative crisp and fuzzy games, respectively.
Section 4 introduces an egalitarian solution for convex fuzzy games by adjust-
ing the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for convex crisp games. Three exam-
ples illustrate that requiring only supermodularity of a fuzzy game does not
assure the existence of such an egalitarian solution. It is proved that adding
coordinate-wise convexity to supermodularity guarantees the existence of a
maximal fuzzy coalition corresponding to a crisp coalition, at each step of
the adjusted Dutta-Ray algorithm. It turns out that the introduced egalitar-
ian solution lies in the core of the convex fuzzy game and coincides with the
Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution of the corresponding crisp game. In Section
5 the equal division core of an arbitrary fuzzy game is introduced and it is
shown that for any convex fuzzy game the egalitarian solution is an allocation
in the equal division core of the game, and the equal division core of a convex
fuzzy game coincides with the equal division core of the corresponding crisp
game. Section 6 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Cooperative crisp games
A cooperative crisp game hN,wi consists of a ﬁnite set of players N, N =
{1,2,...,n} and a map w :2 N → < with w(∅)=0 .F o r S ∈ 2N, w(S) is
called the worth of coalition S and it is interpreted as the amount of money
(utility) the coalition can obtain, when the players in S work together. The
class of crisp games with player set N is denoted by GN.
A game hN,wi ∈ GN is called convex if for each S,T ∈ 2N
w(S ∪ T)+w(S ∩ T) ≥ w(S)+w(T).














consisting of eﬃcient vectors with sum of the coordinates equal to w(N)




An interesting element of the core of a convex crisp game hN,wi is the
Dutta-Ray egalitarian allocation E (N,w) which can be described in a simple
way and found easily in a ﬁnite number of steps. Let |S| be the number of
players in the coalition S, S ∈ 2N. For any coalition S,w ed e n o t ei t sa v e r a g e
worth with respect to the characteristic function w by a(S,w): =
w(S)
|S| .
In Step 1 of the Dutta-Ray algorithm one considers the game hN1,w 1i
with N1 := N, w1 := w, and the per capita value a(T,w1) for each non-
empty subcoalition T of N1. Then the largest element T1 ∈ 2N1 \{ ∅} in
argmaxT∈2N1\{∅} a(T,w1) is taken and Ei (N,w)=a(T1,w 1) for all i ∈ T1
is deﬁned. For a convex crisp game hN1,w 1i it is well known that the ﬁnite
set argmaxS∈2N1\{∅} a(S,w1) is closed w.r.t. the union operation, that is if
S1,S 2 ∈ argmaxS∈2N1\{∅} a(S,w1),t h e nS1 ∪S2 ∈ argmaxS∈2N1\{∅} a(S,w1).
This implies that argmaxS∈2N1\{∅} a(S,w1) has a largest element w.r.t. the
partial order of inclusion on sets, namely ∪
©
T | T ∈ argmaxS∈2N1\{∅} a(S,w1)
ª
.
If T1 = N, then we stop.
In case T1 6= N,t h e ni nS t e p2 of the algorithm one considers the convex
game hN2,w 2i where N2 := N1 \ T1 and w2(S)=w1 (S ∪ T1) − w1 (T1) for
each S ∈ 2N2 \{∅}, takes the largest element T2 in argmaxT∈2N2\{∅} a(T,w2)
and deﬁnes Ei (N,w)=a(T2,w 2) for all i ∈ T2.I f T1 ∪ T2 = N we stop;
o t h e r w i s ew ec o n t i n u eb yc o n s i d e r i n gt h eg a m ehN3,w 3i with N3 := N2 \ T2
5and w3(S)=w2 (S ∪ T2) −w2 (T2) for each S ∈ 2N3 \{ ∅},e t c .A f t e raﬁnite
number of steps the algorithm stops, and the obtained allocation E (N,w) is
called the constrained egalitarian solution of the game hN,wi.
Since the constrained egalitarian solution is in the core of the correspond-
ing convex game, it is interesting to study the interrelation between E(N,w)
and every other core allocation in terms of a special kind of domination which
can be introduced as follows.
Consider a society of n individuals with aggregate income ﬁxed at I units.
For any x ∈ <n
+ denote by b x =( b x1,...,b xn) the vector obtained by rearrang-
ing its coordinates in a non-decreasing order, that is, b x1 ≤ b x2 ≤ ...≤ b xn.F o r





i=1 yi = I,w es a yt h a tx Lorenz dominates
y, and denote it by x ÂL y,i ﬀ
Pp
i=1 b xi ≥
Pp
i=1 b yi for all p ∈ {1,...,n− 1},
with at least one strict inequality.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Dutta and Ray (1989) prove that for
convex crisp games the constrained egalitarian solution Lorenz dominates
every other core allocation.
Another core-like solution concept which is related to the norm of equity
is the equal division core introduced by Selten (1972). Given a cooperative






xi = w(N), @S ∈ 2
N \{ ∅} s.t. a(S,w) >x i for all i ∈ S
)
,
consisting of eﬃcient pay-oﬀ vectors for the grand coalition which can not be
blocked by the equal division allocation of any subcoalition. It is clear that
the core of a cooperative crisp game is included in the equal division core of
that game.
63 Cooperative fuzzy games
Given the set N = {1,2,...,n} of players, a fuzzy coalition is a vector
s ∈ [0,1]
N.T h e i-th coordinate si of s is called the participation level of
player i in the fuzzy coalition s.I n s t e a do f[0,1]
N we will also write FN for
the set of fuzzy coalitions. A crisp coalition S ∈ 2N corresponds in a canonical




if i ∈ S,a n d
¡
eS¢
i =0if i ∈ N \ S.T h ef u z z yc o a l i t i o neS corresponds to
the situation where the players in S fully cooperate (i.e. with participation
level 1)a n dt h ep l a y e r so u t s i d eS are not involved at all (i.e. they have
participation level 0). We denote by ei the fuzzy coalition corresponding
to the crisp coalition S = {i}. The fuzzy coalition eN is called the grand
coalition, and the fuzzy coalition (the n−dimensional vector) (0,0,...,0)
corresponds to the empty crisp coalition. We denote by FN
0 the set of non-
empty fuzzy coalitions.
A fuzzy game hN,vi consists of the player set N and a map v : FN → <
with the property v(0) = 0.T h e m a p v assigns to each fuzzy coalition a
number, telling what such a coalition can achieve in cooperation. In the
following the set of fuzzy games with player set N will be denoted by FG N
and in the next sections we will consider the crisp operator cr : FG N → GN.
For a fuzzy game hN,vi ∈ FG N, the corresponding crisp game hN,cr(v)i ∈
GN is given by cr(v)(S)=v(eS) for each S ∈ 2N.















So, x ∈ C(N,v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the grand
7coalition eN, where for each fuzzy coalition s, the total payoﬀ is not smaller
than v(s),i fe a c hp l a y e ri ∈ N with participation level si is paid sixi.
As p e c i a lc l a s so ff u z z yg a m e sw i t han o n - e m p t yc o r ei st h ec l a s so fc o n v e x
fuzzy games introduced in Branzei et al. (2002a). Here hN,vi ∈ FG N is
called convex iﬀ v satisﬁes the increasing average marginal return (IAMR)
property, i.e. for each s1,s 2 ∈ FN with s1 ≤ s2,e a c hi ∈ N and all ε1,ε2 ∈
<++ with s1
i + ε1 ≤ s2




























The IAMR property is equivalent to the following pair of properties (cf.
Theorem 6 in Branzei et al. (2002a)):
(i) Supermodularity (SM):
v(s ∨ t)+v(s ∧ t) ≥ v(s)+v(t) for all s,t ∈ F
N,
where s ∨ t and s ∧ t are those elements of [0,1]
N with the i−th coordinate
equal to max{si,t i} and min{si,t i}, respectively;
(ii) Coordinate-wise convexity (CwC):
For each i ∈ N and each s−i ∈ [0,1]
N\{i} the function gs−i :[ 0 ,1] → <
with gs−i(t)=v(s−i k t) is a convex function. Here (s−i k t) is the element
in [0,1]
N with (s−i k t)j = sj for each j ∈ N \{ i} and (s−i k t)i = t.
Hereafter we will denote the class of convex fuzzy games with player set
N by CFGN.
4 An egalitarian solution for convex fuzzy games
We will introduce here an egalitarian solution for a convex fuzzy game by
adjusting the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for a convex crisp game.
8As mentioned in Section 2, at each step of the Dutta-Ray algorithm for
convex crisp games a largest element exists. Note that for the crisp case
supermodularity of the characteristic function is equivalent to convexity of
the corresponding game.
However, when a cooperative fuzzy game is convex, convexity of the game
is equivalent to supermodularity and coordinate-wise convexity of the charac-
teristic function. As we show in Lemma 1, supermodularity of a fuzzy game
implies a semilattice structure of the corresponding (possibly inﬁnite) set of
fuzzy coalitions with maximal average worth, but it is not enough to ensure
the existence of a maximal element as it is illustrated by three examples.
According to Lemma 4 it turns out that adding coordinate-wise convexity
to supermodularity is suﬃcient for the existence of such a maximal element.
Moreover, this element corresponds to a crisp coalition.
For each s ∈ FN,l e tdsc :=
Pn
i=1 si.G i v e nhN,vi ∈ FG N and s ∈ FN
0
we denote by α(s,v) the average worth of s with respect to the aggregated





Note that α(s,v) can be viewed as a per participation-level-unit value of
coalition s.










is closed w.r.t. the join operation ∨.
Proof. Let α =s u p s∈FN
0 α(s,v).I fα = ∞,t h e nA(N,v)=∅,s oA(N,v)
is closed w.r.t. the join operation.
9Suppose now α ∈ <.T a k e t1,t 2 ∈ A(N,v). W eh a v et op r o v et h a t
t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A(N,v),t h a ti sα(t1 ∨ t2,v)=α.














































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the (SM) property and the second
inequality follows from the deﬁnition of α and the fact that v(0) = 0.T h i s
implies that v(t1 ∨ t2)=αdt1 ∨ t2c,s ot1 ∨ t2 ∈ A(N,v).
We can conclude from the proof that in case t1,t 2 ∈ A(N,v) not only
t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A(N,v) but also t1 ∧ t2 ∈ A(N,v) if t1 ∧ t2 6=0 .F u r t h e r ,A(N,v)
is closed w.r.t. ﬁnite ”unions”, where t1 ∨t2 is seen as the ”union” of t1 and
t2.
I fw et r yt oi n t r o d u c ei naw a ys i m i l a rt ot h a to fD u t t aa n dR a y( 1 9 8 9 )
an egalitarian rule for supermodular fuzzy games, then problems may arise
since the set of fuzzy coalitions is inﬁnite and it is not clear if there exists
a maximal fuzzy coalition with ”maximum value per unit of participation
level”. To be more precise, if hN,vi is a supermodular fuzzy game then
crucial questions are:
(1) Is sups∈FN
0 α(s,v) ﬁnite or not? Example 2 presents a fuzzy game for
which sups∈FN
0 α(s,v) is inﬁnite.
(2) In case that sups∈FN
0 α(s,v) is ﬁnite, is there a t ∈ FN
0 s.t. α(t,v)=
sups∈FN
0 α(s,v)? A fuzzy game for which the set argsups∈FN
0 α(s,v) is empty
i sg i v e ni nE x a m p l e3 .N o t et h a ti ft h es e targsups∈FN
0 α(s,v) is non-empty
then sups∈FN
0 α(s,v)=m a x s∈FN
0 α(s,v).
(3) Let ≥ be the standard partial order on [0,1]
N.I f maxs∈FN
0 α(s,v)
exists, does the set argmaxs∈FN
0 α(s,v) have a maximal element in FN
0 w.r.t.
10≥?T h a tt h i sd o e sn o ta l w a y sh o l df o raf u z z yg a m ei ss h o w ni nE x a m p l e4 .






2 if s ∈ [0,1)
0 otherwise
.
For this game sups∈F
{1}
0 α(s,v)=∞.





s2 if s ∈ [0,1)
0 otherwise
.
For this game sups∈F
{1}
0 α(s,v)=1 ,a n dargsups∈F
{1}
0 α(s,v)=∅.





s1 + s2 if s1,s 2 ∈ [0,1)
0 otherwise
.
For this game maxs∈F
{1,2}
0 α(s,v)=1 , argmaxs∈F
{1,2}
0 α(s,v)=[ 0 ,1)×[0,1)\
{0}, but this set has no maximal element w.r.t. ≥.
O n ec a ne a s i l yc h e c kt h a tt h eg a m e si nE x a m p l e s2 ,3 ,4a r es u p e r m od u l a r ,
but not convex (the (CwC) property is not satisﬁed). For convex fuzzy games
all three questions mentioned above are answered aﬃrmatively in Theorem
6. By using this theorem, the following additional problems can also be
conquered: how to deﬁne the reduced games in the steps of the adjusted
algorithm, and whether this algorithm has only a ﬁnite number of steps.
The following Lemma 5 plays a key role in obtaining our main results
on egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games. In its proof we will use the no-
tion of degree of fuzziness of a coalition.F o r e a c h s ∈ FN this degree is
11deﬁned by ϕ(s)=|{i ∈ N | si ∈ (0,1)}|.N o t e t h a t ϕ(s)=0implies that
s corresponds to a crisp coalition, and that in a coalition with ϕ(s)=n no
participation level equals 0 or 1. Note further that for s ∈ FN
0 with ϕ(s)=0




, because s is equal to eT,w h e r e
T = {i ∈ N | si =1 }.
Lemma 5 Let hN,vi ∈ CFGN and s ∈ FN
0 .I fϕ(s) > 0,t h e nt h e r ei sa
t ∈ FN
0 with ϕ(t)=ϕ(s) − 1, supp(t) ⊆ supp(s),a n dα(t,v) ≥ α(s,v);i f
α(t,v)=α(s,v) then t ≥ s.
Proof. Take s ∈ FN
0 with ϕ(s) > 0,a n di ∈ N such that si ∈ (0,1).
Consider t0 =( s−i,0) and t1 =( s−i,1).N o t et h a tϕ(t0)=ϕ(t1)=ϕ(s)−1
and supp(t0) ⊂ supp(t1)=supp(s).
If t0 =0 ,t h e nt1 = ei and then α(ei,v) ≥ α(siei,v)=α(s,v) follows
from (CwC). We then take t = ei.
If t0 6=0and α(t0,v) > α(s,v),t h e nw et a k et = t0.
Now we treat the case t0 6=0and α(t0,v) ≤ α(s,v).F r o m t h e l a s t
inequality and from the fact that
v(s)
















































































So, we can take t = t1.
From Lemma 5 it follows that for each s ∈ FN
0 , there is a sequence
s0,s 1,...,s k in FN
0 ,w h e r es0 = s and k = ϕ(s) such that ϕ(sr+1)=
ϕ(sr) − 1, supp(sr+1) ⊆ supp(sr),a n dα(sr+1,v) ≥ α(sr,v) for each r ∈
{0,1,...,k− 1}.S i n c eϕ
¡
sk¢
=0 , sk corresponds to a crisp coalition, say
T.S o ,w eh a v ep r o v e d
∀s ∈ F
N
0 ∃T ∈ 2






From (4) it follows immediately
Theorem 6 Let hN,vi ∈ CFGN.T h e n
(i) sups∈FN











generates the largest element in
argsups∈FN
0 α(s,v),n a m e l yeT∗.
In view of this result it is easy to adjust the Dutta-Ray algorithm to a
convex fuzzy game hN,vi.I nS t e p1 one puts N1 := N, v1 := v and considers
argsups∈FN
0 α(s,v1). According to Theorem 6, there is a unique maximal
element in argsups∈FN
0 α(s,v), which corresponds to a crisp coalition, say




for each i ∈ S1.I fS1 = N, then we stop.
13In case S1 6= N,t h e ni nS t e p2 one considers the convex fuzzy game


























1 if i ∈ S1
si if i ∈ N \ S1
.









for all i ∈ S2.
If T1 ∪ T2 = N w es t o p ;o t h e r w i s ew ec o n t i n u eb yc o n s i d e r i n gt h ec o n v e x
fuzzy game hN3,v 3i,e t c .A f t e raﬁnite number of steps the algorithm stops,
and the obtained allocation E (N,v) is called the egalitarian solution of the
convex fuzzy game hN,vi.
Theorem 7 Let hN,vi ∈ CFGN.T h e n
(i) E (N,v)=E (N,cr(v));
(ii) E (N,v) ∈ C (N,v);
(iii) E (N,v) Lorenz dominates every other allocation x ∈ C(N,v).
Proof. (i) This assertion follows directly from Theorem 6 and the ad-
justed Dutta-Ray algorithm given above.
(ii) Note that E (N,v)=E (N,cr(v)) ∈ C (N,cr(v)) = C (N,v),w h e r e
the ﬁrst equality follows from (i), the second equality follows from Theorem
7(iii) in Branzei et al. (2002a), and the relation E (N,cr(v)) ∈ C (N,cr(v))
is a main result in Dutta and Ray (1989) for convex crisp games.
(iii) E (N,cr(v)) Lorenz dominates every other element of C (N,cr(v))
according to Dutta and Ray (1989). Since E (N,v)=E (N,cr(v)) and
C (N,cr(v)) = C (N,v), our assertion (iii) follows.
145 The equal division core for convex fuzzy
games
Given a cooperative fuzzy game hN,vi,w ed e ﬁne the equal division core







N), @s ∈ F
N
0 s.t. α(s,v) >x i for all i ∈ supp(s)
)
.
So x ∈ EDC(N,v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the
grand coalition eN, where for each fuzzy coalition s, there is a player i with
a positive participation level for which the pay-oﬀ xi is at least as good as
the equal division share α(s,v) of v(s) in s.
Some interesting facts w.r.t. the equal division core for convex fuzzy
games are collected in
Theorem 8 Let hN,vi ∈ CFGN.T h e n
(i) C (N,v) ⊆ EDC(N,v);
(ii) E (N,v) ∈ EDC(N,v);
(iii) EDC(N,v)=EDC(N,cr(v)).
Proof. (i) Suppose x/ ∈ EDC(N,v).T h e n t h e r e e x i s t s a n s ∈ FN
0 s.t.







which implies that x/ ∈ C(N,v).S oC (N,v) ⊆ EDC(N,v).
(ii) According to (i) and Theorem 7(ii), we have E (N,v) ∈ C (N,v) ⊆
EDC(N,v).
15(iii) Suppose x ∈ EDC(N,v). Then by the deﬁnition of EDC(N,v) there








for all S ∈ 2N,t h e r ei sn oS 6= ∅ s.t.
cr(v)(S)
|S| >x i for all
i ∈ S. Hence, x ∈ EDC(N,cr(v)).
Let x ∈ EDC(N,cr(v)). We prove that for each s ∈ FN
0 there is an
i ∈ supp(s) s.t. xi ≥ α(s,v).





. Now, from (4) it follows that xi ≥ α(s,v) for i ∈ T ⊆ supp(s).
Remark 9 From the proof of Theorem 8(iii) it follows that for each arbitrary
fuzzy game hN,vi we have EDC(N,v) ⊆ EDC(N,cr(v)).B u tt h e s es e t sa r e
not necessarily equal, as the following example shows.
Example 10 Let N = {1} and v(s)=
√
s for each s ∈ [0,1]. For this game
EDC(N,cr(v)) = {e1} and EDC(N,v)=∅.
Our last example is meant to illustrate the various interrelations among
the egalitarian solution, the core, and the equal division core for convex fuzzy
g a m e sa sd i s c o v e r e di nT h e o r e m s7a n d8 .
Example 11 Let N = {1,2,3} and T = {1,2} ⊂ N. Consider the unanim-





1 if s1 = s2 =1
0 otherwise
.
In Branzei et al. (2002a) it is proved (Proposition 9) that a fuzzy game of


















It is easy to see that E (N,ueT) Lorenz dominates every other allocation in



































It is clear that C (N,ueT) ⊂ EDC(N,ueT)=EDC(N,cr(ueT)).
G i v e nT h e o r e m s7a n d8i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to provide an axiomatic char-
acterization of the egalitarian solution on the class of convex fuzzy games.
Inspiring here is the paper of Klijn et al. (2000) where there are ﬁve axiom-
atizations of the classical Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution. By introducing in
a straightforward way the fuzzy counterpart of the max-consistency axiom
we obtain the analogue of Theorem 3.3 in Klijn et al. (2000) for the class of
convex fuzzy games
Theorem 12 There is a unique solution on CFGN with the properties eﬃ-
ciency, equal division stability and max-consistency, and it is the egalitarian
solution.
Here equal division stability means that the solution assigns to any convex
fuzzy game an element of the equal division core.
6F i n a l r e m a r k s
In this paper we introduce the equal division core for fuzzy games and the
egalitarian solution for convex fuzzy games. With the aid of the key result
17in Lemma 5 we prove the coincidence of the egalitarian solution and the
equal division core for a convex fuzzy game with the corresponding solution
concepts for its related crisp game. This implies that we can calculate the
egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game by considering the corresponding
crisp game, and applying on it the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm.
It would be interesting to develop egalitarian solution concepts also for
non-convex fuzzy games. Inspiring in this could be the original constrained
egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989), the Lorenz solution (Hougaard
et al. (2001)), the Lorenz stable set and the egalitarian core (Arin and Inarra
(2001)) for cooperative crisp games.
Also other systems of axioms for the egalitarian solution than the one
indicated at the end of Section 5 could be developed (cf. Klijn et al. (2000)).
References
[1] J. Arin, E. Inarra, Egalitarian solutions in the core, International Jour-
nal of Game Theory 30 (2001) 187-193.
[2] J.P. Aubin, Coeur et valeur des jeux ﬂous à paiements latéraux, C.R.
Acad. Sci. Paris 279 A (1974) 891-894.
[3] J.P. Aubin, Cooperative fuzzy games, Mathematics of Operations Re-
search 6 (1981) 1-13.
18[4] A. Bhattacharya, On the equal division core, Mimeo, GEMMA, Univer-
site de Caen, 2002.
[5] A. Billot, Economic theory of fuzzy equilibria, Springer-Verlag, Heidel-
berg, 1995.
[6] R. Branzei, D. Dimitrov, S.H. Tijs, Convex fuzzy games and participa-
tion monotonic allocation schemes, CentER Discussion Paper 2002-13,
Tilburg University, The Netherlands, 2002a.
[ 7 ]R .B r a n z e i ,D .D i m i t r o v ,S . H .T i j s ,H y p e r c u b e sa n dc o m p r o m i s ev a l u e s
for cooperative fuzzy games, CentER Discussion Paper 2002-14, Tilburg
University, The Netherlands, 2002b.
[8] D. Butnariu, Fuzzy games: a description of the concept, Fuzzy Sets and
Systems 1 (1978) 181-192.
[9] B. Dutta, The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in con-
vex games, International Journal of Game Theory 19 (1990) 153-169.
[10] B. Dutta, D. Ray, A concept of egalitarianism under participation con-
straints, Econometrica 57 (1989) 403-422.
[11] T. Hokari, Population monotonic solutions for convex games, Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory 29 (2000) 327-338.
[12] J. Hougaard, B. Peleg, L. Thorlund-Petersen, On the set of Lorenz-
maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game, International Jour-
nal of Game Theory 30 (2001) 147-165.
19[13] F. Klijn, M. Slikker, S. Tijs, J. Zarzuelo, The egalitarian solution for
convex games: some characterizations, Mathematical Social Sciences 40
(2000) 111-121.
[14] A. Lebret, A. Ziad, Fuzzy cooperative games and political models,
GEMMA Discussion Paper No. 1-2001, 2001.
[15] E. Molina, J. Tejada, The equalizer and the lexicographical solutions for
cooperative fuzzy games: characterizations and properties, Fuzzy Sets
and Systems 125 (2002) 369-387.
[16] I. Nishizaki, M. Sakawa, Fuzzy and multiobjective games for conﬂict
resolution, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2001.
[17] M. Sakawa, I. Nishizaki, A lexicographical concept in an n−person co-
operative fuzzy game, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 61 (1994) 265-275.
[18] R. Selten, Equal share analysis of characteristic function experiments, in:
H. Sauermann (Ed.), Contributions to Experimentation in Economics,
Vol. 3, Mohr, Tübingen, (1972) 130-165.
[19] M. Tsurumi, T. Tanino, M. Inuiguchi, A Shapley function on a class
of cooperative fuzzy games, European Journal of Operational Research
129 (2001) 569-618.
20